46

 

LECTURE II - REFLECTIONS ON ASIAN REALITIES

 

The first thing that I should say is a reaction to what happened this morning. I would want to take seriously that this is basically a sharing of notes as well as a sharing of understanding. Hopefully, after I have said what I have to say you will not only ask questions but present counter proposals or counter analysis. This is specially true because we are dealing with a reality in which all of us are involved. I have been away from this part of the world for some time and now that I am back (and in the academic community) what I may say from that vantage point may not tally with your own experience in the various forms of involvement with those represented here. I have simply to admit that limitation. I am presently esconched in an academic milieu,

 

47

 

a very popular Christian milieu, in which it is not easy to experience and encounter the realities, which we may want to talk about here. It is a challenge to be teaching at this time in an academic, Christian community, for the simple reason that if there are any isolations on the part of the academic community, these are doubly underscored by the fact that our university is “Christian”. I am saying that not in the spirit of putting down the Christian university, but to give a descriptive presentation of the context in which I operate.

Earlier, I was saying that the ideological and political milieu is cluttered, and that the sense of bi-polarity in the past may no longer be workable. There seems to be all kinds of renovation, new developments, in the traditional ideological and political postures that have to be integrated in our understanding of what it means to be involved, as well as to be engaged, in human liberation. Some years back, if I was given this talk (towards the end of the '60s) I would have started that Asia is the center of world politics. There are a number of reasons for this: primarily the Vietnam War was going on - a preoccupying, central struggle in the world that caught its attent­ion. Few other conflicts in the past, sup­posedly regional conflicts, had done so. Some people compare it in terms of its magnitude - as a summary form of the con­tending forces of the Age, compared with the Spanish civil war in the '30s - focusing in one struggle some of the main ingredients of the politics of its time: feudalism vs. modernization; fascism vs. democratic rule; communism vs. capitalism; national liberat­ion vs. imperialism. All of these major forces that have been in the under-current have been summed up in a dramatic way by the Vietnam war.

I think, one of the remaining tasks of the Christian community is to give a serious reflection on the significance and meaning of the war for the region. I don't think that that kind of evaluation has happened yet in terms of a consistent understanding of the implications of the war. Some people are avoiding it! This, and another point – the whole rise of China in the Asian horizon – are two themes that tended to be avoided by the Christian community in this part of the world for the simple reason that these focused on something which Christians don't like to recognize: That Asia has a socialist component to it and the challenge of the socialist component of Asian politics is a form of suffering of a benign neglect of the Christian community. Until such time emerges, that due recognition is given to this phenomenon, I don't think that we are really being ecumenical in the region (here the word ecumenical is construed as an expression which has to do with the whole inhabited world-THE OIKOUMENE!).

Some people from this part of Asia, or in our midst, are not fulfilling our task as a re­gion. We are still a remnant of the 'Christian cold war'. The Church in Asia is outdated by the emerging current of politics. At the time when all kinds of secular forces, politics itself, are having a run of the region, the Christian community has not exerted efforts to relate to socialist countries as secular powers. There is so little that is said of China in our Christian councils!

I said that if I was starting this talk, say four or five years ago, I don't think this can be said. Today, there is a relative quieting down of the political scene in Asia into one of watching and waiting of the revolution in Indo-China. News of what is happening is dribbling in – bit by bit. One of the results has been the fact that the Asia that emerged after Vietnam seems to be different from what was anticipated by both sides of the global political fence. When you come right down to it, both sides, the communists and the capitalists, I think have held on to some incipient domino theory of the war. The later seem to be saying: We must defend Vietnam because if we don't then all the domino pieces will fall after it. This has, in fact, helped in the kind of irrational

 

48

 

involvement the U.S. had in undertaking the war. The whole of Asia is involved here and if we don’t watch out then the fall of Vietnam will mean the fall of all Asia.

The former seems to be saying that victory in Vietnam will be a signal for progress and liberation for Asia. That victory in the war will inevitably unlease progressive efforts in the region. In my assessment, neither of these predictions has happened. As a matter of fact, the post-Vietnam War situation has basically changed the balance of power in the region. I don't think that American presence in the region has been limited or affected by Vietnam. There is no such thing as a domino theory in the region. The fall of Vietnam is just the fall of Vietnam, and not of Asia. At best, Vietnam is pre­sently engaged in consolidation, post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation. It is not necessarily involved in extending abroad the revolution. The anticipated spread of mili­tary armament, which were left by the U.S. on to other countries seem not to be happen­ing. The inclination to extend first the results of the revolution within their society rather than foment revolution elsewhere in the region is just a front of the western capitalists. Both of these predictions, in a negative or positive ways, I would say have not happened.

As we look at the Asian scene at this time, the dominant power one has to deal with is American power! I don't think that any one can beat it in a real sense. The U.S. is the real power in this region. On its own part, in terms of presence, the U.S. has made quite a dramatic shift in its strategy and Policy. This, to my view, is symbolized by the emergence of militarism. The militarization of politics in Asia, the centralization of Power in military control is the new face the imperialist strategy in the region.

This new phenomenon of the military acquiring political power is one primary thing worth looking into.  Militarization that is happening in this part of the world has peculiarities to it and not quite identifiable with the fascism of the past. There are a lot of peculiar ingredients to it - not so much a conservative force but a revolutionary one. In this sense, militarism taking place here is a progressive ideology. Some claim that what is happening in our midst in really the institution of martial law as the only way of breaking with the past. It has modernizing tendencies that present itself to the people as the way towards the future rather than just as the preservation of the past. Military rule identifies the oligarchs as the enemies of the state. I find it quite fascinating reading some of the articles written by supporters of the New Society. They harp on the decadence of the old oligarchs and how martial law, as an agent of progressive forces in the country, eliminate this force for conservatism.

The military in Indonesia claims this as well: That they are the modernizing force and that what is happening in our midst is the renewal of society rather than the preservation of the elements of the past. This combination of the military power and the new technocratic power has given this militarization a new identity. Military regimes in the past did not have this element of close ties between the technocrat and the military. Now, they are together and some of them are even the futurologists.

One of my fascinating discoveries lately is that old liberal friends of mine, which initiated me in the path of dissent, the liberal teachers at the University of the Philippines, are now part of the Administration. They say today, that there is not necessary antagonism, between their early conception of liberal dissent, with their being part of the government today, for the simple reason that what we have today is in fact, an implementation of what they believe a new society, ought to be other thing that fascinates me no end is the manner the tremendous effort being exerted by President Marcos of being some kind of modern-day exempliciation of the

 

49

 

Philosopher King. President Marcos projects himself, not simply as a holder of power, but as a philosopher and visionary envisaging all kinds of future. He wants to present the image that the reason he is in power is that he has a more workable vision of society than the others. He writes on the philosophy of human rights on which he has twelve articles. There is no president in the whole history of the Philippines, which starts from Spanish times, who has tried to re-write Philippine history up to the Year 2000. That is the image he wants to project - that of a Philosopher-King. He is a historian, juridical philosopher, political theorist, inter­preter of human values, and maybe the builder of the City of God. To a certain extent, there is some truth to this. There is a difference between the military rule of South Korea and the Philippines because President Park is not writing history.

The emergence of the combination of mili­tary power and technocracy began since the Indonesians started it. Those who run business, the technocrats, and the military join in running the country. This current political reality has a number of ideological props, which I would like to discuss as one of the major realities we have to deal with in Asia today. Several presuppositions:

First, presupposition behind the so-called military technocracy is the process of quantification. This means the quantifi­cation of the resources of the society to the extent that they say that the basic national problem in a given situation is economic. In other words, he who feeds the people will win them, or those who provide the fastest form of economic de­velopment. In the end, what people are asking for is food, material quantification, and this is the very first tenet of the ideo­logy of military technocracy and they stick to it in a very stringent way.

Second, the business of plotting, or quantifying the economic resources of the region must be in the hands of the competent people (not the task of nincompoops or simpletions). Two signal examples of the principle are the Philippines and Singapore. In these two countries, there is a tremendous emphasis on the role of the tachnocrat. They believe that not everybody knows how to develop the country economi­cally. Economy has to be very consciously planned, it has to be efficiently laid down. The planning must be done in a very ex­tremely intelligent and efficient way. Only a very select group of people can, and should be given a hand in doing this.

Third, the economic quantification, planning and direction, must be undertaken and led by a very educated and intelligent elite. These individuals are graduates of Harvard, Berkeley, Yale, Stanford with various degrees, especially in Economics –these are needed. These are to be competent people-those who know their theories, economic processes that are needed for the development of the people. These are not only intelligent and qualified, but they must also be competent. For example, President Marcos invites some of the Balikbayans (Filipinos who live abroad and come for visits) to join the new society.  The other element here is' the insistence on the part of the leaders of the New Society that development of this kind needs time. The country's development does not happen overnight, it will take a long period of time. The government must be given a chance to prove its theories right – and for this, time is needed.

To be given time to prove its economic theories right means that there must be stability in the country – and for this, the military is required. The military is able to prevent forces for decadence and destruction not to wreck havoc on the land. These four points above – educated elite, competence, time, and the military – are from the notes I have taken from an interview with the ministry of Information of Indonesia when I visited there four years ago.

As I began raising questions, the three points were said: economic development

 

50

 

and quantification is our primary problem – we are poor. We need efficient people; we need time in order that the plans, which are being worked out by the competent people will be realized; and, during the period of development, there must be stability which the military alone can provide. Under this program, the disruptive forces must not be allowed to take over the situation.

And what are these disruptive forces? One of these would be student movements. Government planned to do away with so-called ideological student movements and replace them with the so-called functional groups. Disruptive groups, so-called were the religious student movements - Muslims, Christians, etc. They were to be replaced by functional groups like associations on engineers, doctors, or along vocational lines. Parenthetically, he showed me a blueprint. It was in blue, of course, just like house blueprints. At the left hand corner, I saw the words: RAND CORPORATION. (Rand is one of the think-tank set-ups in Washington).

In all these, I asked him where the people are. How about the people? I mean, the broad masses of the people. His answer was; The people will have to wait! In the end, it is they who would benefit from all these. They should not worry now because the Plan is for them. It has occurred to me plainly at the time that this was the face of the capitalist strategy in this part of the world. What is important is to quantify the resources of the country. At the present time, there should be no talk about justice, human rights, freedom of speech. These are disruptive. Give a chance for this project to develop. This will make them happy. Benefits will, in the future, trickle down to them. But, for the present – Hold it! Don’t allow the disruptive forces to emerge or have control!

It has dawned on me then that this is fundamental, this inherent elitism, conceived in the end – that people themselves are dysfunctional to the process of Development. People themselves, under this philosophy, are not the source of development – they are disruptive to it. As one Latin American commentator said on Militarism: At this stage of the game, the people are only a disfunctional element because of their tendency to emotive politics. People are emotional, volatile, not rational enough. They must be put in a situation where they will not disrupt. After all, it is on their behalf, it is for the people, that development is for, and not for the rulers.

For all these to take place, what is needed is not only a socially aroused and a socially conscious technocracy but also a socially conscious and a socially visionary military.

In some of the analysis on the emergence of martial law in the Philippines, it was noted that prior to its declaration there was a decadent society, economics, and politics. Democratic institutions were said to be on the way down, and that they were not working too well. There was corruption, Congress was merely a debating club. Within the relatively decaying situation, there emerged a conception of the military, the one socially salvatory force, embued with social consciousness. In this sense, a socially conscious and aroused military becomes the hope of the future working hand in hand with a socially aroused technocracy.

As I look at the ideological situation in Asia today, it is not cluttered in the sense that there are all kinds of options: The ideology of the Military Technocracy on the one hand and various forms of socialism on the other.

I think that the tremendous appeal, which the military technocracy here, have achieved has eliminated any dream of liberal demo­cracy. It is no longer a viable option. The military will not allow, I am sure, the return of the liberal democrats. In other words, even the liberal democracies, say Washing­ton, have begun to discover that formal development implies centralization of power. What this means, in any case, is a

 

51

 

disavowal of the people, their marginalization. The people become basically objects of progress worked by some forces elsewhere. People are not participants in this road to progress. They could even be a dys­functional force. Basically, the ideological force in Asia is divided solely on these two lines: the appeal and projections of basically futuristic ideologies, under the socialist aegis on the one hand, and the military technocracy on the other. It seems to me that our task is to chart between these two ideological choices, as a form of witness. Even with the change of regimes in both India and Sri Lanka is not going to mean anything to liberal democracy establish­ments even in those two countries. They are going to shift to centralization of power. They are on the road to it!

This phenomenon of greater and greater centralization of power under the aegis of military technocracy is going to be the trend in our region rather than the excep­tion. The only counterpoint, the only real one to it, is socialism. I don't think there is any gray area in this sense. What form of socialism is something else. We must also be critical about socialism. But, nor are we going to dismiss the forms of socialism Socialisms also have mass power; mass appeal.

I am saying this because there are some people who say that there might be a third force that might be unleased, like some form of Christian ideology. There are those, for example, who believe that the Christian church may have some kind of ideology that does not fall in either camp- but may even humanize the two. That is at least being said. This is where I become suspicious of our Christian socialist friends in Latin America. Some of them are saying that the only real ideological option between Marx­ism and military technocracy is Christian ideological thinking —Christian clericalism.