The Bourgeoisie Divides and Rules

Samantha Weerasooriya

What happened in Sri Lanka in July 1983 is but the worst so far of a series of similar eruptions of racial violence in which the main victims have been people of the Tamil minority community. Such eruptions of anti-Tamil racial violence had periodically occurred in the island since the granting of political independence to Sri Lanka by its British .colonial masters in 1984 — with riots in 1958, 1977, 1981 and 1983. This violence has been the consequence of the inability of successive Sri Lankan governments since independence to resolve an outstanding problem in the country's body politic: the problem of ethnic chauvinism and minority discrimination.

Ethnic Conflict

The building of an independent Sri Lanka over the past thirty years has consistently been a process of socio-political accommodation along communal lines. The origins of this can be seen in the pre-independence electoral process, which provided for representation in the legislature on a communal basis according to ethnic population proportions. The Sri Lankan population is divided into ethnic groups comprising the Sinhala people (74% of the population), Tamil people (18.2%). Moor and Malay (7.4%) and other (mainly Eurasian, Chinese, North Indian) (0.4%)

The Tamil ethnic community, which is the largest minority group, can be further divided into the "Sri Lankan Tamil" (comprising 12.6% of the overall population) being (like the Sinhalese) historic inhabitants of the island, with their home still being the tea plantation enclaves in the "Indian Tamil" (5.6% of the population) being descendants of South Indian migrants imported by the British for their plantations in the 19th century and with their home still being the tea plantation enclaves in the central hill-country.

Discrimination Against Minority Communities

Discrimination against the minority ethnic

communities by the majority Sinhala community began with the very inception of Sri Lankan self-government. The first to be affected were the minority "Indian Tamil" (essentially the plantation labor community) who were deprived of their status as citizens and stripped of their voting rights by acts of legislation in 1948 and 1949. These laws reduced almost the entirety of the Indian Tamil community to the level of "Stateless" persons with no place to call their home and bereft of even the minimum social opportunities enjoyed by the other communities in the country.

Then in 1956, the former colonial state language, English, was replaced with Sinhala as the official language. 1956 is the watershed year, which saw the firm establishment in State power of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism, which at that time projected more of a face of anti-western imperialism in accordance with the aspirations of a particular section of the local bourgeois class.

The adoption by the State of the Sinhala language as the sole official language of the country immediately deprived the Sri Lanka Tamil, Indian Tamil and Moor communities — all of whom spoke the Tamil language — of the ability to use their mother tongue in the public sector of the life of the country. Since the State has played an ever-increasingly dominant role in the country's economy, the limitation of official language solely to the Sinhala language meant that the section of the vast mass of impoverished lower classes who belonged to the Tamil-speaking minorities had to learn Sinhala in order to compete for employment in the public sector, which was the principle employment generator in a society ridden with unemployment. This became a major socio-economic discrimination against the Tamil-speaking minorities.

To this, must be added the discrimination against the Tamils in the sphere of education, particularly higher education, which in an impoverished, under-developed society, was an important means of social mobility. To this,

further, must be added the deliberate program implemented by successive governments of settling Sinhala peasants on a large scale in parts of the "traditional homelands" of the Sri Lankan Tamil community in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. This program was seen as a deliberate policy of changing the population composition of these areas, which were traditionally mainly or entirely populated by Tamils.

The Ideology of Sinhala-Buddhist Chauvinism

Since the whole island area is under the political and legal control of one single State, such a land settlement program as described above would have seemed innocuous if it was not a program imposed by a chauvinistic majority community which is in control of the State and which is endeavoring to superimpose its identity over those of the other minority communities. While in Sri Lanka today communal consciousness pervades all communities, it is the chauvinist ideology of the Sinhala-Buddhist community, which is basic to the ideology of the current State and which today has become the psychological foundation for racist attitudes and behavior on the part of the majority Sinhala community.

This ideology is based on the myth that the Sinhala language speaking community is a "pure" race descended from the Aryans, who inhabited Northern India 2,500 years ago. It is based on the mythology of a community of "Aryans" who arrived in the island about 500 BC and became the first "civilized" people to settle here. The fact that Buddhism was adopted by this civilization as the State religion very early in the island's history and has flourished here while it died out in its original birthplace of India has given rise to the belief that this "pure" Sinhala race has been, and yet is, the sole protector of Buddhism in its purest form in the world. With the consolidation of the Buddhist religion in the island by the end of the 2nd century B.C., the Buddhist Sangha (the institutionalized monkhood), which

depended on State patronage and public support for its maintenance, readily incorporated these legends and popular beliefs into a systematic mythology which was then presented as the "history", of the Sinhala "race" and civilization. Since it was the Buddhist monkhood (Sangha) which recorded and compiled the history of the ancient Sri Lankan Kingdoms, the Sangha thus performed the ideological function of interpreting local history as the history of a solely "Sinhala" (and "Aryan") civilization which had been "chosen" to protect and foster buddhism in its "pristine form."

This mythology made excellent material for the incipient Sinhala bourgeosie of the late 19th century, who, in a British-ruled Sri Lanka with its indigenous civilization destroyed by Western imperialism several centuries before, needed a fresh indigenous ethos on which to develop their social hegemony. To this monocultural chauvinism of the Sinhala bourgeosie in the colonial period must be added the complicating factor of the British colonial administration's own policy of dividing and treating the various ethnic communities differently. Thus, in employment in public administration and the public sector in general, the colonial rulers favored the recruitment from the westernized social elite of the Tamil community from the Northern and Eastern Provinces. This practice merely served to intensify the fears of the Sinhala-Buddhist belief that the Sinhala "race" were the only "true" heirs to the island of Lanka and that the Tamils were the "historic enemies" of the Sinhalese with a tradition of regularly invading from South India.

Sinhala-Buddhist State Domination and Growing Ethnic Conflict

The introductory process of self-rule initiated by the British in the pre- Independence period functioned on a communal basis (as mentioned above) and thereby set the tone for all future Sri Lanka politics. Unlike the Congress Party in India, Sri Lanka never saw the growth of a truly

pan-national political party (except for the Communist Party before it went into coalition-politics) and to the present day, all political parties cater to the special interest of one ethnic community or another.

The establishment of a Western-style Parliamentary representative system at Independence however enabled the Sinhala bourgeoisie to effectively take control of the Sri Lankan neo-colonial State with the support of the Sinhala majority community's electoral vote. The competition between the two main bourgeoise Sinhala Parties for the majority community vote served to intensify the use of Sinhala Chauvinist ideology by the bourgeoisie. The attempt to maintain bourgeoi. State power amidst a growing neo-colonial economic crisis saw the increased neglect of the welfare of the minority communities by a Sinhala ruling class concerned with keeping the Sinhala mass vote. The propagation of the ideology was ably carried out through the education system and the Sangha, which willingly supported a State, which had gone as far as constitutionally guaranteering the "protection" of Buddhism.

In this process, it was the second largest ethnic group, the Tamil-speaking community, which felt the strength of its own identity enough to resent the monocultural outlook of the State and the growing socio-economic discrimination against the minorities. The resentment and growing dissent of the Tamil community in the post-Independence era only attracted with greater and greater repression by an intolerant Sinhala-Buddhist State backed by a Sinhala populace made increasingly paranoid by intensified communal-chauvinist propaganda. The sharpening inter-ethnic tension finally resulted in the option for secession and a separate State (in the North and East named "Eelam") by the Tamils. This radical stance by the Tamils merely served to enhance "the fears of the Sinhalese and widen the gulf between communities. The frequency of the bouts of anti-Tamil rioting grew.

The launching of a military struggle against the Sinhala State by Tamil seccessionist guerilla groups in the late 1970's soon became the main threat to the stability of a Sinhala dominated Sri Lanka neo-colonial State already rendered shaky by the vagaries of an under-developed, neo-colonial economy. Consequently, the Sinhala bourgeoisie more vigourously whipped up Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism (and continues to do so) as a narcotic by which to pacify the working masses of the majority community who were feeling increasingly the weight of the economic burdens heaped on them. Since independence, whatever attempt by a sinhala party in power to grant reasonable rights and opportunities to the Tamil community invariably was aborted following criticism by the Sinhala parties in opposition who opportunistically interpreted such measures as "betrayals" of the Sinhala majority community in order to appear champions of Sinhala chauvinism themselves.

As the Tamil guerilla campaign expanded into a full-scale struggle in the 1980s, the gulf between the Sinhalese and the Tamils widened to one of bitter hatred and suspicion between the communities.

The Anti-Tamil Pogrom of July 1983

The largest ever Armed Forces casualties in a single Tamil guerilla attack on July 23, 1983 provoked a wave of killing, looting and destruction, which in scale far exceeded all previous anti-Tamil riots combined. While the severity of the riots has been sufficient to send the political system into a crisis situation and cause a major setback to the economy, the nature of the riots themselves was significant in its difference from previous pogroms. What was significant was that in addition to the (now usual) spontaneous anti-Tamil rioting by the general Sinhala public, which this time spread island wide, there was a series of concerted attacks against and, the systematic destruction of, nearly every single major Tamil-owned economic enterprise, which could only have been carried out by powerfully organized and co-

ordinated groups of persons with prior planning. At the end of the rioting, there was not many Tamil establishment, from the smallest kiosk to the large industries, that was left standing in the entire island except in the Tamil homeland district in the extreme North and the East.

While the government itself immediately drew a red-herring by describing the organized violence as the work of communist groups, this claim has not been proven and in fact the government has already lifted the ban on the Communist Party of Sri Lanka (CPSL), which is one of the three most active Left parties which were banned under Emergency Regulations. Earlier, in banning the Moscow-oriented CPSL, the government claimed that a foreign power had orchestrated the riots to destabilize the country, implying that the pogrom was the work of the Soviet Union and the "Reds". However, to-date, the government has never categorically accused any organization and never shown any evidence to support these wild allegations. In fact, these claims are no longer repeated.

The real picture of what took place in July 1983 is far more frightening than any external "Red" bogey. Everybody in Sri Lanka knows, without doubt, that whatever organization was involved it was not Marxist or Left wing, but most definitely Sinhala chauvinist and Right-wing. In the first place, the island wide burning and looting of individual Tamil homes and street-corner shops was the result of spontaneous violence by the general Sinhala public. Secondly, these attacks were inspired by anger against the Tamil guerilla strikes and paranoia over the Tamil (and by extension, Indian) "threat" to the existence of the Sinhala "race". Thus, not only does the Sinhala public in each locality know the gangs of hooligans of the area who led the attacks, but also the racist-minded Sinhalese have no desire to pass the responsibility for the attacks onto anybody else. The subservience of the public on a mass-scale to such frightening modes of thinking brings to mind the mass

racism whipped up in Nazi Germany and currently prevailing in Israel and South Africa.

Furthermore, there is the dimension of the organized, systematic destruction of large Tamil-owned industries. These attacks, which took place in the main industrial zone around Colombo city, were carried out by teams of thugs who came in vehicles (some of them believed to be State vehicles) from outside the locality. These bands went about their attacks even after Emergency had been declared, a curfew imposed and troop deployed throughout the metropolitan region. The confidence with which these terror gangs carried out their attacks despite the curfew and in full view of the Armed Forces units (who, being predominantly Sinhala themselves, did little to stop the violence), created the impression that these thugs had the sponsorship of powerful political forces, most likely within the government itself. While not a word has been publicly stated within Sri Lanka, even in speculation, as to who the powerful politicians might be, the Tamil propaganda groups overseas have openly accused extreme Sinhala-chauvinist factions within the governing United National Party itself of masterminding the attacks on Tamil industries.

There is another aspect, which however, has at least been grudgingly and guardedly acknowledged in public — that is the serious breakdown of Armed Forces discipline during the riots when there were several instances of actual attacks on Tamil settlements in the North and East by the forces while in the rest of the country for at least two days of savagery the predominantly Sinhalese troops apparently did nothing to stop the anti-Tamil mobs and in some notorious instances allegedly encouraged the mobs and even participated in the attacks.

A Nation Divided and a State in Crisis

The July '83 pogrom resulted in a virtual de facto division of the country — the very thing the Sinhala Bourgeosie State wanted to avoid and the Sinhala public is paranoid about.

Large number of Tamils living outside their traditional homeland (except for the plantation Tamil workers) had to flee for safety to home areas in the extreme Northern districts and in the Eastern coastal belt. The political party representing Tamil interests in Parliament, the Tamil United Liberation Front (TLUF) was made illegal by a Constitutional amendment barring the advocation of seccessionism. With intensified repression (mass detentions, intimidation, assault and "disappearances") of political activists by the Armed Forces in the Tamil homelands, the TULF had to flee to India in the wake of several thousand Tamil refugees. In addition, the trickle of Tamil youth going into guerilla struggle has become a flood with hundreds of youth (who face continuous harassment by the Forces) known to be slipping across the narrow sea straits to South India to join the guerilla movement, which is based there.

Meanwhile, popular sentiment has been whipped up in South India in sympathy with the Tamils whose historic origins were in that region. This popular sentiment combined with the growing refugee influx compelled the Indian Government to intervene to try to resolve the conflict.

Sri Lankan President, Junius Jayewardene and his own faction within the ruling UNP and also the Opposition (Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) led by former Premier Sirimavo Bandaranaike, needed little Indian prodding to take the initiative to resolve the conflict. While the July pogrom has devastated the economy and tarnished the carefully-nurtured "democratic" image of the country internationally, the two political leaders are also aware that if nothing is done to at least ensure the security of life of the Tamil community, the rapidly-growing Tamil Liberation Movement will explode with all the fury of the intense suffering and frustration experienced by this community. With the intensified racist hatred and paranoid on the side of the Sinhalese, this could lead to a civil war similar to what has wrecked Lebanon for decades, and with the imminent

possibility of an Indian military intervention to prevent genocide.

With this as the immediate prospect, the UNP government has so far co-operated with the Indian government and is now endeavoring to bring in all political parties acceptable to the present bourgeoi political framework (excluding the two Left parties yet under an Emergency ban, although they have been legally recognized) to an "All Party Round-Table Conference" to negotiate the rights, facilities and opportunities to be granted to the Tamil minority.

The success of the current negotiations is terribly uncertain. Ironically, the dominant social elite, the Sinhala bourgeoisie is today trapped by a monster of its own making — the Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism and ethno-centrism it encouraged amongst the masses of the Sinhala majority community is today a racist consciousness of paranoia and hatred beyond control. Thus, while Jayewardene and their political following may be willing to accommodate the Tamils in some way, there is the danger that Right-wing politicians of marginal groups or even the Sinhala chauvinist factions within the UNP and SLFP might opportunistically portray such an accommodation as a "betrayal" of Sinhala interests and thereby whip up Sinhala public opposition to any such solution. There is also the danger that the ultra-conservative Buddhist monkhood may adopt a similar line of action. The Left-wing parties have all adopted programs to resolve the communal conflict in terms of justice and democracy far exceeding the limited outlook of the bourgeoi parties, but with two of the three main Left parties now banned and the other Left groups being extremely marginal, there is little impact the Left can have on the current process.

Thus, it is the dominant bourgeoisie, which has the virtually impossible task of resolving the current crisis. As some Right-wing analysts have already begun to admit, there is little prospect of resolving the conflict at a fundamental

level. What is being sought is merely a limited accommodation of the Tamil demands for autonomy in their homelands without giving away too much of the powers of the central State. Thus, reason and justice take second place over the political expediency of the ruling social elite. Such is the dilemma of Sri Lanka as it enters 1984.*

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Taken from Praxis Nos. 3-4, 1983.